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in

JURISDICTION
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(h) confers original jurisdiction over this appeal, which
is an appeal from an order entered in a domestic relations case.
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
First Issue: Did the trial court abuse its discretion by mandating incremental
increases in Mr. Richardson's alimony obligations, to be implemented as each of the
parties' minor children attain the age of eighteen, when such increases were mandated
primarily to enable Ms. Richardson to pay speculative and discretionary expenses related
to adult children?
Second Issue: Did the trial court abuse its discretion in awarding retroactive
alimony, even though Ms. Richardson never requested interim alimony or retroactive
alimony until trial?
Standards of Review (for both issues): Alimony determinations are reviewed for
an abuse of discretion. Griffith v. Griffith, 985 P.2d 255 (Utah 1999); Kelley v. Kelley. 9
P.3d 171 (Utah Ct. App. 2000). "Trial courts have considerable discretion in determining
alimony and property distribution in divorce cases, and will be upheld on appeal unless a
clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion is demonstrated." Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d
1209, 1211 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). In exercising its discretion, however, the trial court
must make explicit findings of fact in support of its legal conclusions. Montoya v.
Montoya, 696 P.2d 1193, 1194 (Utah 1985).
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PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUES
The first issue, regarding prospective changes in alimony, was preserved during
trial (see R. 304 (trial transcript at 178-79 and 193) and in a post-trial motion and
memoranda in support of a motion for reconsideration of the trial court's memorandum
decision (see R. at 61; 64-65 and 83-85).
The second issue, regarding retroactive alimony, was preserved in a post-trial
motion and memoranda in support of a motion for reconsideration (see R. at 61; 65; 67;
84-85).
RELEVANT STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 30-3-5(8), SUBSECTIONS (a), (c) and (g) (i)- (ii):

(8) (a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining alimony:
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse;
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income;
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support;
(iv) the length of the marriage;
(v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor children requiring support;
(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or operated by the payor
spouse; and
(vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase in the payor
spouse's skill by paying for education received by the payor spouse or allowing the payor
spouse to attend school during the marriage.
* * * *

(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living, existing at the
time of separation, in determining alimony in accordance with Subsection (8)(a).
However, the court shall consider all relevant facts and equitable principles and may, in
its discretion, base alimony on the standard of living that existed at the time of trial.
* * * *

(g) (i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive changes and new
2

orders regarding alimony based on a substantial material change in circumstances not
foreseeable at the time of the divorce.
(ii) The court may not modify alimony or issue a new order for alimony to
address needs of the recipient that did not exist at the time the decree was entered,
unless the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify that action.
[Emphasis added]
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-45-2(6) AND (7):

(6) "Child" means:
(a) a son or daughter under the age of 18 years who is not otherwise emancipated,
self-supporting, married, or a member of the armed forces of the United States;
(b) a son or daughter over the age of 18 years, while enrolled in high school during the
normal and expected year of graduation and not otherwise emancipated, self-supporting,
married, or a member of the armed forces of the United States; or
(c) a son or daughter of any age who is incapacitated from earning a living and, if able
to provide some financial resources to the family, is not able to support self by own
means.
(7) "Child support" means a base child support award as defined in Section 78-45-2,
or a monthly financial award for uninsured medical expenses, ordered by a tribunal for
the support of a child, including current periodic payments, all arrearages which accrue
under an order for current periodic payments, and sum certain judgments awarded for
arrearages, medical expenses, and child care costs.
§ 78-45-3:
(1) Every father shall support his child and every child shall be presumed to be in
need of the support of his father. Every man shall support his wife when she is in need.
(2) Except as limited in a court order under Section 30-3-5, 30-4-3, or 78-45-7.15:
(a) The expenses incurred on behalf of a minor child for reasonable and necessary
medical and dental expenses, and other necessities are chargeable upon the property of
both parents, regardless of the marital status of the parents.
(b) Either or both parents may be sued by a creditor for the expenses described in
Subsection (2)(a) incurred on behalf of minor children.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-45-4:
(1) Every woman shall support her child and every child shall be presumed to be in
need of the support of his mother. Every woman shall support her husband when he is in
need.
(2) Except as limited in a court order under Section 30-3-5, 30-4-3, or 78-45-7.15:
(a) The expenses incurred on behalf of a minor child for reasonable and necessary
UTAH CODE ANN.
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medical and dental expenses, and other necessities are chargeable upon the property of
both parents, regardless of the marital status of the parents.
(b) Either or both parents may be sued by a creditor for the expenses described in
Subsection (2)(a) incurred on behalf of minor children.
§ 30-3-3, SUBSECTIONS (1U3) AND (4):
(1) In any action filed under Title 30, Chapter 3, 4, or 6, and in any action to establish
an order of custody, parent-time, child support, alimony, or division of property in a
domestic case, the court may order a party to pay the costs, attorney fees, and witness
fees, including expert witness fees, of the other party to enable the other party to
prosecute or defend the action. The order may include provision for costs of the action.
UTAH CODE ANN.

(3) In any action listed in Subsection (1), the court may order a party to provide
money, during the pendency of the action, for the separate support and maintenance of
the other party and of any children in the custody of the other party.
(4) Orders entered under this section prior to entry of the final order or judgment may
be amended during the course of the action or in the final order or judgment.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE, PROCEEDINGS, AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Summary On or about August 26, 2003, Kynda Kay Richardson petitioned for a
divorce from her husband, Kenneth Andrew Richardson, in the Third Judicial District
Court for Salt Lake County.

Among other things, Ms. Richardson requested alimony and

child support. Ms. Richardson did not request interim alimony in her Petition, and no such
request was made until the day of trial.
Ms. Richardson's custody of the parties' four minor children (Dana, Kyle, Avery,
and Justin) was not contested, and the trial court awarded Ms. Richardson physical
custody. The trial court awarded $1,374 per month in child support to Ms. Richardson,
with Mr. Richardson's obligations terminating with respect to each child, either upon the
child's eighteenth birthday or graduation from high school. The trial court ordered that
Ms. Richardson was entitled to alimony of $420 per month. The trial court further ordered
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that prospective increases in Mr. Richardson's alimony payments, in increments of $100
per month, should be implemented each time one of the four minor children reaches the
age of eighteen. The trial court determined that Ms. Richardson was entitled to retroactive
alimony, back to the time of the separation of the parties, even though Ms. Richardson had
never moved for interim alimony before trial. After a motion for reconsideration, the trial
court amended its ruling to make alimony retroactive, back to May of 2004 only.
Proceedings and Factual Background Ms. Richardson filed her Petition for
Divorce on August 26, 2003. See R. at 1. Mrs. Richardson did not move for temporary
alimony under Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3 during the pendency of the action. A trial was
held on February 8, 2005. After hearing testimony and argument, the trial court took the
issues under advisement. See R. at 304 (trial transcript at 193).
During trial, Ms. Richardson testified that the parties' two oldest children had lived
at home and attended college after reaching the age of eighteen, during which time the
parties had supported them. See R. at 304 (transcript at 31-33). On this basis, Ms.
Richardson requested that the parties be required to treat the four minor children still
domiciled with her the same way. See id. (transcript at 33). Ms. Richardson admitted,
however, that there was no verbal or written agreement with Mr. Richardson that the other
children would be treated the same way. See id. (transcript at 67- 68 (beginning lines 2325 of page 68; ending line 15 of page 68)).
Also during trial, Ms. Richardson made her first requests for retroactive alimony,
including the period during which the action was pending. See R. at 304 (transcript at 39;
158; and 165).
5

The trial court issued a Memorandum Decision on June 3, 2005. In its
Memorandum Decision, the trial court determined that Mr. Richardson should pay $420
per month in alimony, for a term equal to the length of the marriage. See R. at 57. The
trial court further determined that 6\ . . a good part of the income needed by Petitioner to
maintain the appropriate standard of living is also attributable to child support payments
from Respondent. * * * * . _ because the reasonable expenses associated for a time even
with older children will not necessarily diminish to zero as they reach 18 years old and
because some expenses . . . will not necessarily be significantly or proportionately reduced
the court concludes that it is reasonable to increase alimony to some extent as
Kynda's income from child support payments goes down and as Kenneth's expenses from
such payments also diminish." See R. at 57. The trial court therefore determined that, as
each of the parties' children reaches the age of eighteen, the Mr. Richardson's alimony
payments should increase by $100 per month. See id. The trial court also determined that
alimony should be paid retroactively back to the date of the parties' separation. See id. at
58.
On July 7, 2005, Mr. Richardson filed his Motion for Reconsideration with the trial
court. See R. at 61. After full briefing by both sides, the trial court granted the Motion for
Reconsideration in part, and denied it in part. See R. 103-117. The trial court did not alter
its decision with respect to prospective alimony increases, and reasoned that the increases
were not based on speculation, but rather, on circumstances foreseeable at the time of the
divorce. See R. at 106-107 and 207.
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With respect to retroactive alimony, the trial court reconsidered and foreshortened
the retroactive award period. In support of its power to make the retroactive award, the
trial court opined that no statutory language prohibited retroactive awards, and that it had
broad equitable powers to award retroactive alimony. See R. at 109-110. As further
support of the award of retroactive alimony, the trial court asserted, incorrectly, that
retroactive alimony had been requested in the Petition. See R. at 110 (referencing Petition
at If 21); but see R. at 6, ^j 21, which does not contain a request for retroactive alimony.
In Mr. Richardson's favor, the trial court noted that Mr. Richardson had made
generous, voluntary payments to Ms. Richardson before the filing of the Petition, in
amounts as high as $600 per week. See R. at 110. After Ms. Richardson filed her Petition
in September of 2003, however, Mr. Richardson began paying approximately $1,350 per
month (estimated child support only). See id. Starting in May of 2004, Ms. Richardson's
expenses increased because she moved out of her apartment and began making mortgage
payments. See R. at 110. Taking all these factors into consideration, the trial court
amended its ruling, so that retroactive alimony would not be calculated from the time of
separation, but instead, beginning in May of 2004. See id. at 111.
The trial court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and its Decree
in this matter on May 19, 2006. See R. 213 and 234. The trial court awarded $1,374 per
month in child support to Mrs. Richardson, with Mr. Richardson's child support
obligations scheduled to terminate with respect to each child upon the child's eighteenth
birthday or upon graduation from high school, if later. See R. at 235. The trial court
7

ordered Mr. Richardson to pay alimony to Ms. Richardson in the amount of $420 per
month, with increases of $100 per month each time one of the four minor children reaches
the age of 18. See R. at 228-29 and 239 (explaining, at 228-229 that "reasonable expenses
associated for a time even with older children will not necessarily diminish to zero as they
reach eighteen . . . ."). The trial court further ordered that alimony should be retroactive to
May of 2004. See R. at 229 and 240.
At the time of the Decree, the ages of the parties' minor children were as follows:
Dana, 19; Kyle, 17; Avery, 15; and Justin, 12. See R. at 234-35. The eighteenth birthdays
of the parties' minor children are as follows: May 17, 2005 (Dana); July 19, 2006 (Kyle);
August 21, 2008 (Avery); and March 25, 2011 (Justin). See R. at 214 (providing birth
dates). Dana presumably graduated from high school on or about June 4, 2005. See R. at
304 (transcript at 7). No testimony was presented with regard to Dana's, Kyle's, Avery's
or Justin's intentions to attend college, to remain at home, or to support themselves after
their eighteenth birthdays or after high school graduation.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
FIRST ISSUE: The trial court abused its discretion by mandating incremental
increases in Mr. Richardson's alimony obligations, to be implemented as each of the
parties' minor children attain the age of eighteen. The increases were mandated primarily
to enable Mrs. Richardson to pay speculative and discretionary expenses related to adult
children.
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The alimony increases are an abuse of discretion for four reasons. First, the
Richardsons have no legal obligation to support able-bodied children who have reached
the age of eighteen. Second, there was no persuasive evidence that the parties had ever
agreed that they would continue to support the four minor children even after they each
reached the age of eighteen. Third, no evidence was presented regarding the minor
children's intentions to attend college or remain home after reaching the age of eighteen.
Ms. Richardson's request was based only upon the parties' history of supporting two other,
older children who had attended college while living at home. Finally, the increases were
not based upon factual findings regarding Ms. Richardson's expenses at the time of trial,
but were instead based upon speculation about her future expenses.
Even assuming, arguendo, the parties had an agreement about supporting adult
children who stay at home while attending college, the award is based purely on
speculation. The record contains no evidence of minor children's intentions in this regard.
SECOND ISSUE: The trial court abused its discretion by awarding retroactive
alimony because Ms. Richardson never requested interim alimony until trial. Accordingly,
Ms. Richardson waived her right to request interim alimony. A statutory mechanism is
provided to enable parties to request interim alimony before a final judgment is entered.
Because Ms. Richardson did not avail herself of that mechanism, she was precluded from
requesting interim alimony at trial.

ARGUMENT
L

The Court Abused Its Discretion By Requiring Mr. Richardson to Pay
Increased Alimony as a Substitute for Non-Mandatory Child Support
for Adult Children

The purpose of alimony is to provide support for the wife. See Medley v. Medley,
93 P.3d 847 at 848, n.4 (Utah Ct. App. 2004) (relying on Georgedes v. Georgedes, 627
P.2d 44, 46 (Utah 1981). An alimony award should enable the receiving spouse to
maintain, as nearly as possible, the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage. Munns
v. Munns, 790 P.2d 116, 121 (Utah CtApp.1990). In determining alimony, a trial court
must consider three factors: (1) the financial condition and needs of the receiving spouse,
(2) the ability of the receiving spouse to produce sufficient income for him- or herself, and
(3) the ability of the responding spouse to provide support. Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d
1369, 1372 (Utah 1988); Haumontv. Haumont, 793 P.2d421, 423 (Utah Ct.App.1990);
Munns, 790 P.2d at 121.
Any future changes in alimony are limited to instances where a material change of
circumstances has occurred. See Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)
(emphasis added). Howell also mandates that the "the standard of living existing at or
near the time of trial" is the appropriate benchmark for determining an alimony award.
See id. at 1212.
In the case at bar, the trial court abused its discretion by awarding automatic, future
increases in its alimony award in order to enable Ms. Richardson to pay speculative
expenses related to the parties' adult children. See R. at 228-229 (explaining that
10

"reasonable expenses associated for a time even with older children will not necessarily
diminish to zero as they reach eighteen . . . .").
First, the automatic increases are not consonant with the goals of alimony. The trial
court did not order automatic increases only to support Mrs. Richardson. Instead, such
increases were awarded, at least in part, for expenses related to the parties' adult children.
The automatic alimony increases are, in effect, disguised and non-mandatory child support
payments.
As a matter of law, the Richardsons have no obligation to provide support to ablebodied, adult children. Under the Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act (hereinafter,
"Support Act"), parents are not ordinarily obligated to provide any support to children over
the age of eighteen. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-1 through 78-45-13.
The Support Act does require parents to support their minor children. See Utah
Code Ann. §§ 78-45-3 (father required to support child); 78-45-4 (mother required to
support child). The Support Act defines a "child," however, as a son or daughter who is
under the age of eighteen, unless the child is emancipated, married, or serving in the
armed forces. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-2(6)(a). The Support Act makes exceptions
for children who are over the age of eighteen, but still in high school during the normal,
expected year of graduation. The Act also includes exceptions for disabled children and
children who are otherwise unable to support themselves. See id. at subsection (b).
At the time of the decree in this case (May 19, 2006), only one of the parties'
children (Dana) had attained the age of eighteen. Dana was scheduled to graduate from
11

high school on or about June 4, 2006. See R. at 304 (transcript at 7, line 23). No findings
were made, however, regarding Dana's ability to support herself after graduation.
Furthermore, no findings were made regarding the remaining three children's ability to
support themselves in the future, and any such findings would have been purely
speculative. As such, the trial court abused its discretion in mandating a $100 increases in
alimony when each child attains the age of eighteen.
Ms. Richardson's justification for requesting alimony to compensate her for
expenses related to adult children was that the parties' two oldest children, Olivia and Ed,
had lived at home while attending college after they reached the age of eighteen, during
which time the parties supported Olivia and Ed. See R. at 304 (transcript at 31-33). Ms.
Richardson admitted, however, that there was no verbal or written agreement with Mr.
Richardson that the four younger children would be treated the same way. See id.
(transcript at 67- 68 (beginning lines 23-25 of page 68; ending line 15 of page 68)). No
testimony was presented regarding which of the four younger children had been accepted
to college, intended to go to college, or intended to remain home after reaching age
eighteen.
As stated above, the payee spouse's standard of living existing at or near the time of
trial is the appropriate benchmark for determining an alimony award. See Howell v.
Howell 806 P.2d 1209, 1212 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). Nevertheless, the trial court awarded
automatic increases in the alimony award each time one of the parties' children attains the
age of eighteen. This was an abuse of discretion not only because the future ability of
each child to support itself is currently unknown, but also because the parties have no legal
12

obligation (either by statute or by agreement) to support such children. Because child
support is not legally mandated for children over the age of eighteen (unless specific,
narrow exceptions are met), the parties in this case should be free to decide, either
individually or together, whether they wish to support their adult children.
The trial court should not have required Mr. Richardson to provide such nonmandatory child support in the absence of a contractual or other obligation to do so. As
the court observed in Grapin v. Grapin, 450 So. 2d 853 (Fla. 1984), married parents may
continue to support college-age children who remain at home, but such support umay be
conditional and may be withdrawn at any time, and no one may bring an action to enforce
continued payments. It would be fundamentally unfair for courts to enforce these moral
obligations of support only against divorced parents while other parents may do as they
choose." See Grapin, 450 So. 2d at 854.
Moreover, the automatic alimony increases awarded in this case are for an
indefinite period of time. While it is true that parents often chose to continue supporting
adult children for some years after they attain the age of eighteen, most parents are
unwilling to do so indefinitely. As the award currently stands, Mr. Richardson has no
ability to petition the court to stop the increased alimony payments, barring unforeseen
circumstances. Otherwise, as long as Mrs. Richardson wishes to continue supporting adult
children, Mr. Richardson is obligated to support them regardless of how old they are. In
effect, Mrs. Richardson can hold him hostage to the decree, and she alone can decide when
to terminate non-mandatory child support (inappropriately labeled "alimony" by the trial
court).
13

II.

Under Utah Law, Automatic Changes in Alimony, Such As the
Automatic Increases Ordered in This Case, Are Disfavored Unless
Supported By Evidence

Under Utah law, alimony determinations must be based upon the payee spouse's
needs either at the time of separation or at the time of trial. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-35(8)(c). See also See Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209 at 1212 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
Furthermore, "[t]he court may not modify alimony or issue a new order for alimony to
address needs of the recipient that did not exist at the time the decree was entered, unless
the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify that action." See Utah Code Ann. §
30-3-5(8)(g)(ii).
The Utah Supreme Court has held that future changes in alimony are best left to
^'future determinations by the court under its continuing jurisdiction." See MacLean v.
MacLean, 523 P.2d 862, at 863 (Utah 1974). Speculation about a party's future financial
situation is not an appropriate basis for mandating automatic adjustments to an award of
alimony. See Rasbandv. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331 at 1334 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (holding
that automatic decreases in an alimony award, based upon trial court's vague and
conclusory findings regarding wife's ability to earn future income, were improper). When
no evidence is adduced in support of an order containing periodic changes to alimony
payments, such periodic changes are an abuse of discretion. See Ridge v. Ridge, 542 P.2d
189 at 191 (Utah 1975) (holding that periodic reductions in alimony and ultimate
termination thereof was abuse of discretion because not based on the evidence at hearing,
which only showed husband's income had gone down by an amount certain).
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In the context of petitions to modify, the Utah Court of Appeals has unequivocally
stated that "any future changes in alimony are limited to instances where a material
change of circumstances has occurred." See Howell v Howell, 806 P.2d 1209 (Utah Ct.
App. 1991) (emphasis added). Indeed, even a party's impending retirement is an
insufficient basis for a petition to modify. See Nelson v Nelson, 97 P.3d 722, 723-24
(Utah Ct. App. 2004).
In Nelson, the court explained that petitioner's motion to terminate alimony, based
upon his scheduled, impending retirement and concomitant reduction in income, was not
ripe for decision because petitioner had not yet actually retired. According to the Nelson
decision, changes in alimony are not appropriate until an "* imminent clash of legal rights
and obligations'" has ripened. See Nelson, 97 P.3d at 723-24.
In this case, the trial court abused its discretion and misinterpreted relevant law by
requiring Mr. Richardson to pay larger alimony payments to Ms. Richardson as each of
their four minor children reaches the age of eighteen. See R. at 228-229 (explaining that
"reasonable expenses associated for a time even with older children will not necessarily
diminish to zero as they reach eighteen . . . ."). These prospective increases are based on
speculation about Mrs. Richardson's potentially ongoing and, in all probability, nonmandatory costs associated with children who may or may not need support after they turn
eighteen. See R. at 304 (transcript at 31-33) (wherein Ms. Richardson testified that
because the parties' had previously supported their two eldest children while they lived at
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home and attended college, she expected that the same would apply to the four younger
children).
This case is analogous to Nelson, where the petitioner's retirement had not yet
occurred, and thus his retirement could not affect his obligation to pay alimony. Similarly,
in this case, three of children had not reached the age of eighteen, and their future ability
to support themselves was unknown. It is also unknown whether or not Dana or the other
three children are or will be attending college or remaining in Ms. Richardson's home.
Moreover, the parties have no obligation to support able-bodied children over the
age of eighteen in the absence of a contractual obligation. See Part I of this Appellant's
Brief, supra. Even if it is determined, in the future, that the parties have a statutory
obligation to support any of their adult children (for example, in the event of disability), it
would be a child support obligation and not a question of alimony.
Essentially, the trial court has engaged in speculation about what voluntary
expenditures the parties would make on behalf of their adult children in the future. That
is not the purpose of either alimony or child support. Alimony is meant to enable the
payee spouse to maintain her standard of living if she so chooses, or in the alternative, to
equalize the income of the parties. Alimony is not meant to compensate the payee spouse
for speculative, future expenditures on adult children that are wholly discretionary. The
payor spouse could just as easily, and most likely will, choose to make discretionary
expenditures on his adult children. If so, the payor spouse will also experience a potential
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reduction in his discretionary income and his ability to pay alimony. Both parties should
be free to decide to what extent they wish to support able-bodied, adult children, free of
court interference.
Finally, to the extent that the alimony increases could be viewed as support for Ms.
Richardson's standard of living, such increases are based upon speculation about the
future. It is unknown whether or not Ms. Richardson's living expenses will remain
constant. She might, for example, move into a less expensive residence as the children
move out. It is also unknown whether or not her earning capacity will increase.
Similarly, it is unknown if Mr. Richardson's earning capacity will remain constant.
His income could abruptly go down at or about the times of the court-ordered increases.
Further, his expenses could increase for a variety of reasons. For example, one of the
younger children could decide to live with him rather than with Ms. Richardson. The trial
court abused its discretion by making assumptions about the parties' future expenses and
their ability to meet such expenses.
III.

The Court Abused Its Discretion in Awarding Retroactive Alimony
Because Mrs. Richardson Had Never Requested Interim or
Retroactive Alimony Until the Conclusion of Trial

Utah law provides, by statute, that in any action to establish an order of custody,
parent-time, child support, or alimony:
(3). . . the court may order a party to provide money, during
the pendency of the action, for the separate support and
maintenance of the other party and of any children in the
custody of the other party.
17

(4) Orders entered under this section prior to entry of the final
order or judgment may be amended during the course of the
action or in the final order or judgment.
See Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3.
An award of interim alimony is improper unless a party has requested interim
alimony during the proceedings. Such retroactive awards are:
contrary to the intent of the statute, which allows a party to
move for interim alimony to meet the party's needs between
separation and divorce. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-3- 3(3)
(1998) (stating "the court may order a party to provide money,
during the pendency of the action") (emphasis added). It was
not intended to be awarded as an afterthought in the final
decree—especially when not requested by the benefitting
party. See id. § 30-3-3(4) (allowing amendment to interim
alimony entered "prior to entry of the final order") (emphasis
added).
See Osen v. Osen, (Unreported Memorandum Decision), April 6, 2000, WL 33249404
(Utah Ct. App.). l
Because Ms. Richardson never requested interim or retroactive alimony in her
Petition or before trial, she waived her claim for such relief. The trial court therefore
abused its discretion by awarding it.

1

Although not officially published, memorandum decisions of the Utah Court of
Appeals may be presented as persuasive authority to Utah's appellate courts, provided
that the parties and the court are supplied with accurate copies at the time the decision is
first cited. See Grand County v. Rogers, 44 P.3d 734 at 738 (Utah 2002). A copy of the
Osen decision is provided in an appendix to this Appellant's Brief.
18

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant Kenneth Richardson requests a reversal of
the Decree, insofar as it mandates increases in alimony as each of the minor children
reaches the age of eighteen. Appellant also requests that the award of interim alimony be
reversed.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

KYNDA KAY RICHARDSON,

]

Petitioner,

]

vs
KENNETH ANDREW RICHARDSON,
Respondent

*

W

])

Case No 034905249 DA

]
)
])

Judge Stephen L Roth
Commissioner Susan Bradford

DECREE OF DIVORCE

The above-entitled matter came before the Honorable Stephen L Roth of the aboveentitled Court on the 8th day of February, 2005. Petitioner appeared in person and was
represented by her counsel, Joseph Lee Nemelka Respondent appeared in person and was
represented by his counsel, J Bruce Reading The Court, having heard argument of counsel and
testimony of the parties and witnesses, having reviewed the file in this matter, having taken the

matter under advisement, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, and having heretofore
entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and good cause appearing therefor,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREE AS FOLLOWS:
1.

Petitioner is awarded a divorce from Respondent based on the existence of

irreconcilable differences that prevent the marriage from continuing
2.

CHILD CUSTODY AND SUPPORT: There were six children born to this

marriage, of whom four are still minors. Dana May Richardson, born May 17, 1987, Kyle Allen
Richardson, born July 19, 1988, Avery Keen Richardson, born August 21, 1990, and Justin
Wallace Richardson, born March 25, 1993 Petitioner is awarded sole physical and legal custody
of the minor children
3.

Respondent shall pay child support to Petitioner in the sum of $1,374 per month

commencing as of the date of trial herein
4.

Respondent's obligation to pay child support shall continue as to each minor child

until that minor child reaches the age of eighteen (18) or graduates from high school, whichever
later occurs.
5.

Pursuant to Utah Code §62A-11-401 et seq and -501, withholding of child support

from Respondent's wages as a means of collecting child support shall be authorized
6.

INCOME TAX EXEMPTIONS: Petitioner shall be awarded the minor children

2

Dana and Justin as dependants for tax exemption purposes and Respondent shall be awarded the
minor children Kyle and Avery. When Dana reaches eighteen (18), the exemptions should
alternate to equalize the benefits as much as possible, with Respondent having the deductions for
two children and Petitioner for one the first year in which there are only three deductions
available, Petitioner having two and Respondent one in the second year, and so on. When the
deductions for children reduce to two, each parent may claim one deduction; when there is only
one deduction left, that deduction goes to Petitioner. In the alternative, for any tax year the party
for whom the exemption(s) is most valuable may elect to purchase the option(s) from the other
party for the amount the other party would lost if the exemption were not available. The parties
shall exchange tax information by March 1st of each year. In any event, Respondent's ability to
claim any minor child(ren) is conditioned upon his being current in his child support and medical
expense obligations.
7.

MEDICAL INSURANCE & EXPENSES: Each party shall provide medical

insurance for the minor children as long as it remains available at a reasonable cost through his or
her employment. If Respondent secures insurance, Respondent shall provide evidence of said
coverage and that such coverage is effective in Utah.
a.

Each parent shall share equally the out-of-pocket costs of the premium

actually paid by a parent for the children's portion of insurance. The children's portion of the
premium is a per capita share of the premium actually paid. The premium expense for the children

3

shall be calculated by dividing the premium amount by the number of persons covered under the
policy and multiplying the result by the number of children in the instant case.
b.

Each parent shall pay one-half QA) of all reasonable and necessary

uninsured medical expenses, including deductibles and co-payments, incurred for the dependent
children.
c.

The parent ordered to maintain insurance shall provide verification of

coverage to the other parent, or to the Office of Recovery Services under Title IV of the Social
Security Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 601 et seq., upon initial enrollment of the dependent children,
and thereafter on or before January 2 of each calendar year. The parent shall notify the other
parent, or the Office of Recovery Services of any change of insurance carrier, premium, or
benefits within 30 calendar days of the date he/she knew or should have known of the change.
d.

The parent who incurs medical expenses shall provide written verification

of the cost and payment of medical expenses to the other parent within thirty (30) days of
payment.
e.

In addition to any other sanctions provided by the Court, a parent

incurring medical expenses may be denied the right to receive credit for the expenses or to
recover the other parent's share of the expenses if that parent fails to comply with above.
8.

PERSONAL PROPERTY: During the marriage the parties acquired certain
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items of personal property including a savings account containing about $1,000 00, a certificate of
deposit in the amount of approximately $6,000 00, a set of firearms collected by Respondent,
tools, certain items of apparel made of animal fur, a Bobcat tractor, and three vehicles a van in
Petitioner's possession and two trucks (a 1981 Dodge Dakota and a 2003 Ford Ranger) in
Respondent's possession Petitioner shall be awarded the savings account, the certificate of
deposit and the van and Respondent shall be awarded the two trucks, the tools, the firearm
collection, the Bobcat tractor, and the fur items
9.

There is also a New York Life Insurance Policy on Respondent's life with a

$50,000 00 face amount and a cash value of about $6,300 00 It is in minor children's interest to
keep the insurance policy in place, with Respondent to pay the premiums, having the minor
children irrevocably designated as the beneficiaries and Petitioner as Trustee for the minor
children Once the last child is emancipated, the policy is to cashed in, with Petitioner to receive
within sixty (60) days thereafter one-half QA) of the cash value of the policy, valued as of the time
of trial The parties have the option, if they both agree to do so, of cashing the policy in now,
with the amount received in payment to be divided equally between them
10

Further, Respondent has a 401(k) that shall be divided equally and a Qualified

Domestic Relations Order shall be prepared, if necessary Any loans taken out by Respondent
since the parties separation shall be added to the balance of the 401(k) prior to division
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Respondent shall provide a copy of his most recent statement showing the current balance and
loan balance of the 401(k)
11

REAL PROPERTY: During the marriage the parties acquired two (2) parcels of

real property the marital home in Eagle River, Alaska, near Anchorage, and an unimproved, 92
acre lot located in a subdivision in Willow, Alaska Neither property is encumbered by a
mortgage or other significant lien Respondent shall be awarded the Willow lot, but shall pay to
Petitioner the sum of $2,500 00 as her share of the Willow lot's value
12

The Eagle River residence shall be sold and the proceeds shall be split equally

between the parties However, if Respondent wants to keep the house, he must pay $30,000 00
to Petitioner
13

ALIMONY: Petitioner is awarded the sum of $420 00 per month in alimony

from Respondent The alimony payment due to Petitioner shall increase by $100 00 per month,
beginning the first day of the month after which each child turns eighteen (18) On this basis,
when the last child turns eighteen (18), the alimony increases to Petitioner will amount to an
additional $400 00 per month
14

Alimony shall continue for a period equal to the length of the marriage Changes

in income due to retirement at a reasonable age are not taken into account here and may be
considered as changes of circumstances in the future, if otherwise appropriate Alimony shall also
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be paid retroactive to and including May, 2004 Said alimony obligation shall be automatically
withheld by the Office of Recovery Services.
15

PARENT-TIME: Respondent shall successfully complete a parenting class that is

functionally equivalent to the multi-week parenting class provided by Valley Mental Health on
court referral. Further, such course shall administered by an agency approved by the State of
Alaska, such as the Men & Women's Center or the Recovery Connection Once Respondent has
done this, parent-time shall begin pursuant to §30-3-37 of the Utah Code. Respondent must
complete the parenting course before the children are required to go to Alaska for parent-time If
Respondent travels to Utah in the interim, even without first having completed the class, and upon
reasonable notice, he shall be allowed minimum parent-time pursuant to §30-3-35 of the Utah
Code, or as the parties may agree. Respondent shall also be given liberal telephone access to the
children at a minimum three (3) times per week, plus e-mail communication if available The
parties shall contact Valley Mental Health (Kathy Reimherr-556-6037) to determine the nature of
its parenting class, and Respondent can complete that program or one in Alaska that is roughly
equivalent (for example, a multi-week parenting class approved by the Alaska counterpart to
Division of Child and Family Services). No later than thirty (30) days from December 23, 2005,
Respondent's counsel shall provide Petitioner's counsel with a description of the class he intends
to take. If the parties are in agreement that the proposed class meets the requirements of the
court, Respondent shall complete the class as soon as reasonably possible. If the parties are in
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disagreement, they shall approach the court for a resolution, but prepare to offer specific
alternatives. As soon as Respondent has provided written verification that he has successfully
completed the appropriate parenting class, his parent-time as set forth above can begin, including
travel to Alaska All applicable provisions of the advisory guidelines set forth in §303-33 of the
Utah Code shall be adopted herein
16

Petitioner is ordered to pay the transportation costs of one (1) visit per year,

provided that (a) there is not only one (1) visit, and (b) arrangements are made at least thirty (30)
days in advance If there is only one (1) visit per year, Petitioner shall be responsible for only onehalf (14) of the transportation costs for that visit.
17

ATTORNEY'S FEES: Respondent shall be responsible to pay Petitioner's

reasonable attorney's fees incurred in this matter in the sum of $4,488 00.
18.

NAME CHANGE:

DATED this /feSiay of

Petitioner shall be restored to her maiden name if desired
/ \ A ^
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FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

The above-entitled matter came before the Honorable Stephen L. Roth of the aboveentitled Court on the 8th day of February, 2005. Petitioner appeared in person and was
represented by her counsel, Joseph Lee Nemelka. Respondent appeared in person and was
represented by his counsel, J. Bruce Reading. The Court, having heard argument of counsel and
testimony of the parties and witnesses, having reviewed the file in this matter, having taken the

matter under advisement, and being otherwisefrillyadvised in the premises, hereby finds as
follows
1.

JURISDICTION AND GROUNDS: As a threshold matter, the court notes that

Petitioner has lived in Salt Lake County since January, 2003, after the separation of the parties in
about mid-2002, and therefore concludes that it has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject
matter of this case Further, the parties have come to disagree deeply over crucial aspects of their
life together, perhaps most importantly over the approach to raising and disciplining their children
While Respondent states that he does not desire a divorce, the parties had the benefit of
counseling before the filing of the Petition, have been separated for over two (2) years and have
established separate lives The court concludes that there are grounds for entering a decree of
divorce based on the existence of irreconcilable differences that prevent the marriage from
continuing
2.

CHILD CUSTODY AND SUPPORT: There were six children born to this

marriage, of whom four are still minors Dana May Richardson, born May 17, 1987, Kyle Allen
Richardson, born July 19, 1988, Avery Keen Richardson, born August 21, 1990, and Justin
Wallace Richardson, born March 25, 1993 The parties do not contest child custody and appear
to be in agreement with Petitioner should have sole physical and legal custody Petitioner was the
primary caretaker for the children prior to the parties' separation and the children continue to live
with her at their present home in West Valley City, Utah, while Kenneth has remained in Alaska,
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where the parties lived since their marriage in Anchorage on August 20, 1980 Petitioner appears
to strongly desire custody, and she has been and continues to be a fit parent There is no
indication that the children have any different custody preference The court concludes that
Petitioner is and has been a fit and proper parent, that there is not reason to disturb the parties'
own agreement with respect to custody.
3

For purposes of the child support calculation, gross income includes income from

almost any source, other than those specifically excluded by the statute See U C A , Section 7845-7 7(1) At the time of trial Respondent was working full time for Aurora Electric in
Anchorage as a project manager/estimator, earning a salary of $1,188 47 per week according to a
January 28, 2005, Employer Earnings Statement showing about $61,800 00 per year Apparently
some time in 2003, after the parties' separation, Respondent was promoted to this supervisory
position from the journeyman electrician position that he had formerly held at Aurora Electric
He received a lower salary in the prior position, but normally and consistently worked substantial
overtime (more than 40 hours per week) during the marriage and thus earned about $5,000 00
(2001 W-2) to $6,000 00 (2002 W-2) more each year than he does now, because as a supervisor,
overtime is no longer available to him Respondent testified that he took the promotion because it
was a job change that he wanted and because his boss urged him to take the new position for the
benefit of the company While there is no indication other than timing that Respondent took the
promotion in order to deliberately reduce his income for purposes of this proceeding, this was in
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significant part a voluntary decision on his part that reduced his income For this reason, the
court believes that it is fair to consider his previous scrapping activities (in which he made up to
$1,000 per year from time to time) as a source of income still open to him and to consider his
historical overtime In all, the court believes that it is reasonable to impute $1,700 00 per year a
reasonable assessment of Kenneth's additional earning capacity for purposes of child support and
alimony calculations, giving him some latitude to make changes in his work position to
accommodate reasonable work-related goals, while recognizing that those changes are largely
voluntary, as well as taking into account his ability to make additional income, as he has in the
past, from scrapping or other work
4

In addition, Respondent receives an annual distribution made to all citizens of the

State of Alaska The most recent such distribution was $919, and Respondent testified that it was
sometimes less and sometimes more The court finds that a reasonable estimate of Respondent's
income from state distributions is between $500 and $2,000, with the average bearing significantly
toward the higher figure, or about $1,500 This annual payment falls within the broad scope of
gross income under the statute, and the court concludes that the $1,500 00 figure is a reasonable
estimate of ongoing income from this source for purposes of calculating gross income (for child
support and alimony) Respondent's gross income for child support purposes is therefore
$61,800 00 plus $1,700 00 plus $1,500, a total of $65,000 per year, or $5,417 00 per month
5

Petitioner is employed by the State of Utah, working full time Her last pay stub
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for 2004 showed her annual salary to be $21,927 00 or $1,827 00 per month Petitioner's work
experience is relatively minimal because of the parties' decisions regarding how their family would
function during the marriage After about a year of employment, Petitioner cared for the children
at home during the marriage, with only short periods of part time employment, and she does not
appear to have developed any specialized job skills There was no evidence that she had either the
opportunity or the capacity to earn more than what she is making now; and the court concludes
that she is fully employed in her present position at the present rate of pay, which is her gross
income
6.

There is no evidence that either party was obligated to any other person for

alimony or child support outside the bounds of this case, and therefore gross income and adjusted
gross income are the same for each party These figures are therefore to be used for calculating
the share of child support attributable to each party, with Respondent to be the obligated party
7.

Based upon the foregoing, Respondent shall pay child support to Petitioner in the

sum of $1,374 per month commencing as of the date of trial herein
8

Respondent's obligation to pay child support shall continue as to each minor child

until that minor child reaches the age of eighteen (18) or graduates from high school, whichever
later occurs.
9

Pursuant to Utah Code §62 A-11-401 et seq and -501, withholding of child support

from Respondent's wages as a means of collecting child support shall be authorized.

5
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INCOME TAX EXEMPTIONS: The parties propose that they should each be

allocated tax deductions for two children, but disagree on which No real basis for allocation was
presented other than the representation that Petitioner needed at least one child deduction as
follows Dana and Justin to Petitioner and Kyle and Avery to Respondent When Dana reaches
eighteen (18), the exemptions should alternate to equalize the benefits as much as possible, with
Respondent having the deductions for two children and Petitioner for one the first year in which
there are only three deductions available, Petitioner having two and Respondent one in the second
year, and so on When the deductions for children reduce to two, each parent may claim one
deduction, when there is only one deduction left, that deduction goes to Petitioner In the
alternative, for any tax year the party for whom the exemption(s) is most valuable may elect to
purchase the option(s) from the other party for the amount the other party would lost if the
exemption were not available
11

MEDICAL INSURANCE & EXPENSES: Each party shall provide medical

insurance for the minor children as long as it remains available at a reasonable cost through his or
her employment

If Respondent secures insurance, Respondent shall provide evidence of said

coverage and that such coverage is effective in Utah
a

Each parent shall share equally the out-of-pocket costs of the premium

actually paid by a parent for the children's portion of insurance The children's portion of the
premium is a per capita share of the premium actually paid The premium expense for the children
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shall be calculated by dividing the premium amount by the number of persons covered under the
policy and multiplying the result by the number of children in the instant case
b.

Each parent shall pay one-half (Vi) of all reasonable and necessary

uninsured medical expenses, including deductibles and co-payments, incurred for the dependent
children
c.

The parent ordered to maintain insurance shall provide verification of

coverage to the other parent, or to the Office of Recovery Services under Title IV of the Social
Security Act, 42 U S C Section 601 et seq , upon initial enrollment of the dependent children,
and thereafter on or before January 2 of each calendar year The parent shall notify the other
parent, or the Office of Recovery Services of any change of insurance carrier, premium, or
benefits within 30 calendar days of the date he/she knew or should have known of the change
d.

The parent who incurs medical expenses shall provide written verification

of the cost and payment of medical expenses to the other parent within thirty (30) days of
payment
e.

In addition to any other sanctions provided by the Court, a parent

incurring medical expenses may be denied the right to receive credit for the expenses or to
recover the other parent's share of the expenses if that parent fails to comply with above
12

PERSONAL PROPERTY: The evidence at trial indicated disagreement over the
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value and division of the certain personal property acquired during the marriage This involved
essentially a savings account containing about $1,000 00, a certificate of deposit in the amount of
approximately $6,000 00, a set of firearms collected by Respondent, tools, certain items of
apparel made of animal fur, a Bobcat tractor, and three vehicles a van in Petitioner's possession
and two trucks (a 1981 Dodge Dakota and a 2003 Ford Ranger) in Respondent's possession
The parties agreed at the end of the trial that Petitioner receive the savings account, the certificate
of deposit and the van and that Respondent be awarded the two trucks, the tools, the firearm
collection, the Bobcat tractor, and the fur items The court has no reason to believe that this
division is not fair and equitable and therefore concludes that it is
13

There is also a New York Life Insurance Policy on Respondent's life with a

$50,000 00 face amount and a cash value of about $6,300 00 Respondent proposed that the
policy be cashed out and the proceeds be share equally between the parties It was not clear to
the court what Petitioner wanted in this regard It appears to the court that it would be of some
value to the parties and in the children's interest to keep the insurance policy in place, with
Respondent to pay the premiums, having the minor children irrevocably designated as the
beneficiaries and Petitioner as Trustee for the minor children Once the last child is emancipated,
the policy is to cashed in, with Petitioner to receive within sixty (60) days thereafter one-half QA)
of the cash value of the policy, valued as of the time of trial The parties have the option, if they

8

both agree to do so, of cashing the policy in now, with the amount received in payment to be
divided equally between them
14

Further, Respondent has a 401(k) that shall be divided equally and a Qualified

Domestic Relations Order shall be prepared, if necessary Any loans taken out by Respondent
since the parties separation shall be added to the balance of the 401(k) prior to division
Respondent shall provide a copy of his most recent statement showing the current balance and
loan balance of the 401(k)
15

REAL PROPERTY: There are two (2) parcels of real property at issue, the

marital home in Eagle River, Alaska, near Anchorage, and an unimproved, 92 acre lot located in
a subdivision in Willow, Alaska Neither property is encumbered by a mortgage or other
significant lien The parties agree that the equity of each property should be divided between
them, but they disagree about the value of each property Petitioner believed the Willow lot to be
worth about $10,000 00, based on unspecified calls to real estate agents in the area Respondent
estimated the lot to be worth $3,000 00 to $4,000 00 and said that it had an assessment value on
the tax notice of $4,200 00 The court believes that an estimated value of $5,000 00 is reasonable
approximation of the value of the lot, given the sparse information presented Petitioner is to
receive $2,500 00 as her share of the Willow lot's value
16

The Eagle River home was purchased about twenty (20) years ago for about
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$50,000 00 It was appraised in early 2004 at $60,000 00 Respondent says the appraisal is
incorrect because it indicates that the house, a modular house, has sanitary sewer, asphalt street,
curb and gutter, which it does not have He believes it is worth $47,000 00 based on a tax
assessment and on his estimate that it will take about $13,000 00 to connect the house to
municipal sewer, a step he says is necessary to make the house saleable Petitioner says she
believes the appraisal is correct, even without a sewer hook-up, and that the house cannot have
depreciated in value since it was purchased The appraisal indicates that property values in the
area are increasing, and no evidence was presented on how property tax assessments were made
Respondent has presented no reliable evidence of the effect on property value of the lack of sewer
hook-up, much less that the value would be directly related to the cost of providing such an
improvement Nor has he presented any evidence of how property tax assessments are made in
the area or how reliable an indication of actual value they are or that property values have
decreased since the purchase of the property for $50,000 00 over twenty (20) years ago The
court believes that the appraisal is the most reliable indication of value under the circumstances
and finds that the house is worth $60,000 00 at the time of trial and the equity should be divided
equally, with the house to be sold and the net proceeds split equally between the parties In the
alternative, if Respondent wants to keep the house, he must pay $30,000.00 to Petitioner.
17

ALIMONY:

u

[T]he purpose of alimony is to prevent the receiving spouse from

10

becoming a public charge and to maintain the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage to
the extent possible " Howell v. Howell, 806 P 2d 1209 (Ut Ct App 1991), citing Fletcher v
Fletcher, 615 P 2nd 1218, 1223 (Utah 1980) The Supreme Court, in Jones v. Jones, 700 P 2d
1072 (Utah 1985), set out "three factors that must be considered in fixing a reasonable alimony
award [1] the financial conditions and needs of the wife, [2] the ability of the wife to produce a
sufficient income for herself, and [3] the ability of the husband to provide support " Id. At 1075
(edits by the court, citations omitted), U C A , Sect 30-3-5(8) (which expands the number of
factors to be considered, while retaining the Jones factors as an essence of the inquiry ) After the
determination of the needs and resources of both parties using the Jones factors, "the court should
set alimony as permitted by those parameters, to approximate the parties' standard of living
during the marriage as closely as possible " Howell, 806 P 2d at 1212 In the case of a long-term
marriage, the alimony award "should, 'to the extent possible, equalize the parties' respective
standards of living and maintain them at a level as close as possible to the standard of living
enjoyed during the marriage '" Id, quoting Gardner v Gardner, 748 P 2d 1076, 1081 (Utah
1988) cf Howell, 806 P 2nd at 1216 n 4 ("The alimony award, however, need not be large
enough to maintain the receiving spouse at the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage if
that amount of alimony would lower the standard of living of the paying spouse below that of the
receiving spouse ")

Having considered "all relevant facts and equitable principles," the court
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"may, in its discretion, base alimony on the standard of living that existed at the time of trial"
U C A, Section 30-3-5(8)(c)
18

Petitioner's income, as discussed above, is $1,827 00 per month Accepting the

annual deductions from her salary as set out in her 2004 year-end pay stub, they are Federal Tax
($465 10), Social Security Tax ($1,286 53), Medicare Tax ($300 88), State Tax $551 73), and
health, dental and vision insurance (together $1,176 52), for a total monthly deduction of about
$315 00 Her net income for alimony purposes is therefore $1,512 00 (The court is not
considering deductions for life insurance for either party because essentially voluntary (on the part
of Petitioner) or building cash value from this point forward (on the part of Respondent)) Child
support payments will be approximately $1,375 00 per month Total net income, without
consideration of alimony tax consequences, is therefore about $2,897 00
19

As to general expense deductions, the court believes that Petitioner's monthly

expenses, as set forth in Exhibit 7, are reasonable, especially considering that she is caring for four
(4) children Neither party presented much evidence of their standard of living at the time of
separation, so the court is relying primarily on evidence regarding their expenses as a fair
substitute or approximation While she filed a financial declaration earlier that stated lower
expenses, the court found credible her explanation that she had been keeping expenses
deliberately low during that period because of the financial uncertainties of the unresolved divorce
and had increased her expenses to a more normal level during 2004, the subject period for Exhibit
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7 Those deductions are supported by detailed monthly expense reports Nevertheless, Exhibit 7
contains more expenses that the court considers as either one-time costs or not allowable for
purposes of alimony determination Those include attorneys fees and mediation costs related to
the divorce in the amount of $1,331 00 They also include $1,779 00 in what appears to be a onetime cost for the purchase of appliances ($906 10 to Maytag on January 26 and $873 05 to
Maytag on February 7), although the court believes that one-half that amount (about ($890 00) is
a reasonable annual budget for general maintenance of a home and its contents over a the long
term, given the number of children in her care and the need to furnish a separate house, and ought
to be included as an expense Because the testimony indicated that the parties historically have
made donations to their church at about ten percent (10%) of income and continue to do so, each
listing such donations as part of their expenses, the court considers these donations as a
continuing part of their previous and present standard of living and will include them as
reasonable expenses for both parties Deducting $185 00 per month for one-time expenses,
Petitioner's reasonable expenses are $3,306 00 per month The deficit between her income,
including initial child support, and her reasonable expenses is therefore about $409 00 per month
20.

Respondent's income, as discussed above, is $5,417.00 per month This amounts

to salary of $61,800 00 per year, plus $1,500 00 state payment and $1,700 00 additional
attributed income, per the analysis set forth above Deductions, per Respondent's weekly Direct
Deposit Earnings Statement, including Medicaid $16 94), Social Security ($72 45), Federal Tax
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$117.85), local tax $5.40) and health insurance $10.25). The court is not considering deductions
for 401k contributions, a medical flex plan and a 401k loan repayment. The loan payment
deduction (amounting to about $193.00 per month) is to pay off a $10,000.00 loan Respondent
took out of his retirement plan in 2003, after the separation, to pay attorneys fees $5,000.00, a
down payment on a new truck ($3,000.00), and a deposit in a savings account $2,000.00). The
court does not believe the repayment on this loan, given its timing and the use of the proceeds,
ought to be counted as a deduction from salary for alimony purposes. Other deductions appear
reasonable. Similarly, the medical flex plan is a voluntary contribution (about $10.00 per week)
that can be used to pay medical expenses as they arise (apparently deductibles and other expenses
not covered by insurance). Because this is essentially a medical savings plan for the benefit of the
Respondent, it should not be counted as a true deduction for alimony purposes.
21.

The total weekly deductions from salary are therefore about $223.00 or about

$966.00 per month. Including an additional $26.00 per month to account for a proportional
amount of deductions for the imputed $1,700.00 per year (there was no evidence that the state
payment of $1,982.00 per year was taxed), the total deductions are about $992.00 per month,
leaving a net income, before any alimony tax benefits of $4,465.00. There was no evidence of the
effect of alimony payments on Respondent's tax liability or alimony receipt on Petitioner's, but
the court does not believe that tax considerations related to alimony would substantially alter the
conclusions reached herein.
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22.

Some expenses the court believes should not be included As discussed above, the

court does not believe that the expenses for repayment of the 401k loan (about $193 00 per
month) and life insurance (which the court estimates at $65 00 per moth based on the absence of
any other evidence other than Respondent's claim to have $165 00 in monthly expenses for all
insurance other than deducted health insurance premiums) should be included for purposes of
alimony determination, as they are not necessities, and neither party urged their inclusion In
addition, Respondent claims a total of $350 00 per month in medical and dental expenses There
was no evidence of a need for health care that would support expenses at that level, especially
since he apparently has employer-provided health insurance for which amounts are deducted from
his salary, and absent any evidence of particular health conditions requiring treatment, the court
believes that $50 00 per month is reasonable Respondent's reasonable expenses are therefore
about $3,628 00
23

Respondent therefore has a surplus of net income over expenses of about $837 00

per month The court notes that, while both the parties and the court have used figures for
income and expenses that appear quite specific, these figures in reality are approximations,
especially as they are meant to ultimately represent amounts received and spent in the future In
determining alimony, the court recognizes and takes into account the imprecision of the amounts
involved
24

Other than the equity in the marital home, the parties have accumulated little in the
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way of resources to supplement their incomes Considering Petitioner's financial condition and
needs and her inability to provide sufficient income to meet those needs, together with
Respondent's ability to provide support and the significant income differential between them even
taking into account the payment and receipt of child support, the court concludes that Respondent
shall pay alimony to Petitioner In addition, the court believes it is significant that this is a long
term marriage in which Petitioner gave up her ability to improve her skills and earning capacity to
care for a large family, so that should play a part in the determination of alimony amounts, as well
See Howell, 806 P 2d at 1213 The court believes that alimony in the amount of $420 00 is a fair
and reasonable award This sum approximates the Petitioner's need, before consideration of the
alimony tax consequences, and falls within Respondent's capacity to pay, as determined by the
court.
25

While a significant amount of her expenses can now be attributed to minor children

in the home, a good part of the income needed by Petitioner to maintain the appropriate standard
of living is also attributable to child support payments from Respondent As children reach the
age of eighteen (18), which will be a regular occurrence over the next few years, the court
believes that Petitioner's income will be reduced disproportionately to the reduction of expenses
both because the reasonable expenses associated for a time even with older children will not
necessarily diminish to zero as they reach eighteen (18) years old and because expenses, such as
mortgage, utilities and so on will not necessarily be significantly or proportionately reduce even
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*"\

when children do leave the home For that reason, the court concludes that it is reasonable to
increase alimony to some extent as Petitioner's income from child support payments goes down
and as Respondent's expenses from such payments also diminish This also contributes to the
goal of maintaining a rough equivalence in the parties' standard of living after a long-term
marriage Id (considering the effects of diminishing child support obligations as children reach
eighteen (18) on the relative disparity of income between spouses) The alimony payments due to
Petitioner should therefore increase by $100 00 per month, beginning the first day of the month
after which each child turns eighteen (18) On this basis, when the last child turns eighteen (18),
Respondent's income will have increase by about $1,375 00 per month, while commensurate
alimony increases to Petitioner will amount to $400 00 per month, leaving him with some cushion
that takes into account the purported increased costs of living in Alaska and not reducing his
standard of living below Petitioner's
26

Alimony should continue for a period equal to the length of the marriage Changes

in income due to retirement at a reasonable age are not taken into account here and may be
considered as changes of circumstances in the future, if otherwise appropriate Alimony should be
paid retroactive to and including May, 2004
27

PARENT-TIME: While it is apparent that Respondent loves his children, during

the marriage he took a decidedly harsher approach to their discipline than did Petitioner, going to
the extreme of punishing them by the use of a belt on occasion and threatening to do so more
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regularly The court believes that this goes beyond acceptable limits on discipline of children and
it apparently played a part in the break up of the marriage The children remain somewhat
intimidated by their father, and their distance from him, both emotional and geographical at this
point, has been exacerbated by his decision that it would be best under the circumstances of the
separation to contact them infrequently While his telephone contacts have recently increased, he
has seen the children only a few times since the separation Some or all of the children have been
in counseling to deal in part with issues involving their father
28

It is in the best interest of the children to reestablish their relationship with their

father as soon as possible and that his access to them be as liberal as the distances involved allow,
at a minimum in accordance with the applicable guidelines for parent time Under the
circumstances, Respondent shall successfully complete a parenting class that is functionally
equivalent to the multi-week parenting class provided by Valley Mental Health on court referral
Further, such course shall administered by an agency approved by the State of Alaska, such as the
Men & Women's Center or the Recovery Connection Once Respondent has done this, parenttime should begin pursuant to §30-3-37 of the Utah Code The court's primary concern is that
Respondent complete the parenting course before the children are required to go to Alaska for
parent-time If Respondent travels to Utah in the interim, even without first having completed the
class, and upon reasonable notice, he should be allowed minimum parent-time pursuant to §30-335 of the Utah Code or as the parties may agree Respondent should also be given liberal
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telephone access to the children at a minimum three (3) times per week, plus e-mail
communication if available The parties should contact Valley Mental Health (Kathy Reimherr556-6037) to determine the nature of its parenting class, and Respondent can complete that
program or one in Alaska that is roughly equivalent (for example, a multi-week parenting class
approved by the Alaska counterpart to Division of Child and Family Services) No later than
thirty (30) days from December 23, 2005, Respondent's counsel shall provide Petitioner's counsel
with a description of the class he intends to take If the parties are in agreement that the proposed
class meets the requirements of the court, Respondent should complete the class as soon as
reasonably possible If the parties are in disagreement, they should approach the court for a
resolution, but prepare to offer specific alternatives As soon as Respondent has provided written
verification that he has successfully completed the appropriate parenting class, his parent-time as
set forth above can begin, including travel to Alaska All applicable provisions of the advisory
guidelines set forth in §303-33 of the Utah Code shall be adopted herein
29.

Petitioner is ordered to pay the transportation costs of one (1) visit per year,

provided that (a) there is not only one (1) visit, and (b) arrangements are made at least thirty (30)
days in advance If there is only one (1) visit per year, Petitioner shall be responsible for only onehalf (V2) of the transportation costs for that visit.
30.

ATTORNEY'S FEES: Based on the Court's assessment that Petitioner's
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expenses are beyond her income and other resources at this point and on its conclusions that
Respondent's resources provide him with a surplus over his expenses (as discussed in connection
with alimony, above), the court concludes that Respondent should be responsible to pay
Petitioner's reasonable attorney's fees incurred in this matter Petitioner has insufficient income
to meet her needs, and alimony payments will bring her income up to the point where her needs
are met, not including attorney's fees Respondent will have a level of surplus and is more able to
pay fees Petitioner should provide evidence of the amount and reasonableness of the fees she
claims to the Court
31

NAME CHANGE:

Petitioner shall be restored to her maiden name if desired

From the foregoing findings of facts, the Court now makes and enters its
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

That the bonds of matrimony hereto and now existing between Petitioner and

Respondent shall be dissolved and Petitioner shall be granted decree of divorce from Respondent,
the same to become absolute and final upon the signing of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law and the Decree of Divorce and the filing of the same with the Clerk of the above-entitled Court
2.

That all matters and issues including, but not limited to, child custody, parent-time,

child support, alimony, division of property and debts, and attorney fees shall be ordered pursuant
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to the foregoing Findings of Fact.
DATED this j ^ d a y of

21

ADDENDUM

Osen v. Osen
(Unreported Memorandum Decision)
April 6, 2000 WL 33249404 (Utah Ct. App.)

Wfetlaw
Not Reported in P 3d
Not Reported in P 3d, 2000 WL 33249404 (Utah App), 2000 UT App 90
(Cite as: Not Reported in P.3d)

UNPUBLISHED OPINION CHECK COURT
RULES BEFORE CITING
Court of Appeals of Utah
Catherine M OSEN, Petitioner and Appellee,
v
Timothy F OSEN, Respondent and Appellant
No. 990015-CA.
April 6, 2000

Steven H Gunn, Salt Lake City, for appellant
Clark B Allred and Gavle F McKeachnie, Vernal,
for appellee
Before GREENWOOD, BENCH, and ORME, JJ
MEMORANDUM DECISION
ORME
*1 The trial court in this case mixed property and
support analysis to an unacceptable degree The trial
court must first divide the property before it can
meaningfully determine the propriety of an alimony
award See Burt v Burt, 799 P 2d 1166, 1170 n 3
(Utah Ct App 1990) ("Proper distribution of property
interests of one sort or another should have come
first, and only then would alimony need to be
considered ") In dividing the marital property, the
division should ordinarily be equal, but an unequal
division can be justified by adequate findings See
Hall v Hall 858 P 2d 1018 1022 (Utah
Ct App 1993), Butt 799 P 2d at 1172
In this case, the court divided the marital property in
an unequal way, but instead of justifying that division
on its own terms, it sought to close the gap in the
value of the parties' property shares by giving
appellant credits against alimony and by observing
that he had benefitted from not having to pay
temporary
support an
adjustment
appellant
characterizes as a retroactive award of temporary
support — Such an approach is questionable anyway
because alimony can later be modified or terminate
by operation of law See Utah Code Ann § 30-35(7)(g) & (8) (Supp 1999) Thus, the present value
of credits against alimony is entirely speculative

FN1 Insofar as the trial court intended an
award of retroactive interim alimony, its
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award in this context was contrary to the
intent of the statute, which allows a party to
move for interim alimony to meet the party's
needs between separation and divorce See
Utah Code Ann § 30-3-3(3) (1998) (stating
"the court may order a party to provide
money, during the pendency of the action")
(emphasis added) It was not intended to be
awarded as an afterthought in the final
decree-especially when not requested by the
benefitting party See id §
30-3-3(4)
(allowing amendment to intenm alimony
entered "prior to entry of the final order")
(emphasis added)
However, the approach in this case was particularly
inappropriate because the court found that appellee's
reasonable expenses did not exceed her income
Thus, she had not demonstrated a need for alimony,
see Georgedes v Georgedes, 627 P 2d 44, 46 (Utah
1981), and the court erred in awarding alimony to
better equalize the parties' incomes when there was
no demonstrated need for alimony — See Burt, 799
P2dat 1170 & n 3

FN2 In view of this conclusion, there is no
need to decide the level at which the trial
court should have set appellant's income in
fixing alimony
However, on the record before us, remand to give the
trial court an opportunity to make findings which
more adequately support the unequal property
division is not necessary First, given certain findings
explicitly made by the trial court and the objectives it
quite obviously sought to accomplish, we are in a
position to recognize findings impliedly made by the
court See Miller v Maitmeau & Co, 1Q99 UT App
216, % 46, 983 P 2d 1107, Hill v Hill 869 P 2d 963
965 (Utah Ct App 1994) Second, it appears to us that
the material evidence is not in dispute and the facts
flow logically from it and need not really be "found "
See City ofOrem v Henne, 868 P 2d 1384, 1388 n 7
(Utah Ct App 1994)
With these precepts m mind, we conclude the
disparate property award in this case is fully justified
by the following facts which are manifest in the
record First, appellee has the custody of a minor
child who needs housing, and it is in the child's best
interest to remain in the home in which he has long
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lived Second, the residential property awarded to
appellee was on the appellee's family's estate and is
surrounded by parcels gifted to appellee's various
relatives, giving her a strong historical and present
connection to it Indeed, the marital property was
procured, in part, through a trade of a parcel earlier
distributed to appellee, which was her separate
property Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the
only practical way to close the gap in value between
the marital property distributed to each party would
be to require appellee to sell or refinance the
residence Either way, this would necessitate her
incurring significant housing expense that she does
not now have and, given her somewhat marginal
financial condition as found by the court, would
necessarily result in a shortfall between her income
and her expenses and lead to a significant alimony
award, with concomitant future entanglement of the
parties, that can otherwise be avoided
*2 Accordingly, on the basis of the foregoing we
affirm the trial court's division of the marital
property We vacate the award of alimony We
otherwise affirm — As both parties prevailed to a
meaningful extent on appeal, each party will bear his
or her attorney fees and costs on appeal See Hall,
858 P 2d at 1027

FN3 In so holding, we agree that appellant
waived his right to have the items of
personalty valued when he did not put on
such evidence at trial and, when given the
opportunity by the trial court to do so posttrial, declined to avail himself of the
opportunity
BENCH, J , concur
GREENWOOD, P J , concur m the result
Utah App ,2000
Osen v Osen
Not Reported m P 3d, 2000 WL 33249404 (Utah
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